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Stanley Fish, the Meaning of Academic Freedom and
Social Responsibility
Peter Bowal*
Discussing academic freedom is similar to discussing freedoms of
other essences – one is challenged to enumerate and master its many themes
and nuances. Professor Fish’s Versions of Academic Freedom: From
Professionalism to Revolution,1 a self-styled “thesis book”, is a literature
review that offers one of the most robust analyses on the subject to date.
Such negotiable nuances, in the form of distinctions and definitions,
present themselves early in Fish’s book. Some observers, for example,
would not fundamentally distinguish between “the advancement of
knowledge”2 and “the search for truth.”3 They would prefer to view them
as the same thing. On the other hand, Fish’s definition of improper
influence in the academy is unimpeachable: distortions “by the interests of
outside constituencies . . . that have something other than the search for
truth in mind.”4
Moving beyond definitions, Fish asserts that “no higher, supervening,
authority undergirds” the pursuit of knowledge and truth.5 One of those
insalubrious external influences, the proverbial elephant in the classroom,
remains corporate funding or, more precisely, the influence and priorities
purchased by it. Yet, the horse has bolted the barn on that issue because
long past is the day where any post-secondary institution in the western
world functioned without a penny of private money. Even if an institution
remained wholly publicly funded, it would be disingenuous to suggest that
the sponsoring government, political party or ministry was wholly free of
political will. That political aspiration is apt to seep into regulation,
overseer appointments and the funding flows.
A more questionable premise of pure academic freedom is the political
philosophy of individual academic faculty members. The academic self is
inherently, and often unknowingly, captive to ideology and worldview.
Academic institutions and the academic enterprise are focused on the
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creation of human-made solutions to policy and scientific problems. The
power and triumph of the human mind to not only find the best way
forward, using public money where possible, but then to hasten to intervene
and apply these solutions to life problems bespeaks of a more liberal,
secular, humanist inclination than might be observed as representative
outside of the academy.
Another element of academic freedom under scrutiny is whether
society can permit, without limitation, high priced and tenured academics to
freely steer their own research agenda throughout their careers without any
regard for the needs of the society that support them. The classical
economic theory in play is that an unfettered market of ideas and research
over a large population of academics will produce an optimum balance of
new, socially-useful knowledge. However, to illustrate with a fanciful
example, can all members of a department take a lifelong research interest
in questions that bear no direct salience whatsoever to the community in
which they derive all their support? How long will community needs be
allayed by the assurance that somewhere in the world solutions are being
found for its problems?
Indeed, as Fish demonstrates, the dance of academic freedom occurs
along the edges and extremes of human endeavor. The single most engaged
concern about academic freedom in North America today is one that Fish
does not analyze at length: the inter-relationship between academic freedom
and tenured job security. Academic freedom, like its analogues in the legal
system of attorney-client privilege and judicial independence, redounds to
social interests and not to the preservation of the individual academic, or
lawyer and judge, respectively. It is too often asserted as a shield to defend
behaviors unrelated to genuine academic inquiry.

